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ABSTRACT 
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack bombards the network with loads of packets and requests that 
consumes the system resources in terms of time, memory, and processors. This paper presents a proposed method 
for forecasting DDoS in networks. The proposed model employs hidden Markov model (HMM) to forecast DDoS 
attacks. The method uses the inherent characteristic features of DDoS to determine the observable states of the 
system.  To avoid intractable computations, Kullback-Leibler divergence algorithm was employed to reduce the 
number of observable states to three. The proposed model is formulated and trained through experiments using 
DARPA 2000 data set and the preliminary results shows that the characteristic features of the DDoS and the 
entropy concept can be used to formulate an HMM to predict DDoS. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Globalinter connectivity has made private networks 
accessible to outsiders. This has created the issue of 
security especially in the competitive industries 
where malicious rivals may gain access into other 
organisations in order to cause damage. It has 
therefore become imperative to find ways of securing 
such networks from malicious attacks. Intrusion 
Forecasting Systems (IFS) evolved as a proactive 
method of stopping damage to systems. Whereas IDS 
alerts about intrusion after damage might have been 
done, IFS will alert before the attack takes place. 
There are different kinds of intrusion into systems 
such as DDoS attacks, Worms, Domain Name 
System (DNS) attacks, router attacks among many 
others Debar H., Dacier M., Wespi A. (1999), Kim, 
G., Lee, S. and Kim, S. (2014)). As stated earlier, 
there are different forms of attacks into systems and 
each has its peculiar patterns and signatures(Debar, et 
al. (1999). In DDoS attacks, unlike other types of 
attack, the attacker does not use the holes in the 
system security but rather he/she launches attack 
against its availability. Here an attacker compromises 
a large number of connected systems by exploitation 
of network software vulnerabilities (Vinchurkar, D. 
P., and Reshamwala, A. 2012). After attack software 
is installed on these systems through secured 
channels, the compromised hosts on which attack 
software is installed simultaneously bombards the 
victim with unwanted (use another word) packets. 
The amount of malicious traffic generated by such 
hosts becomes so much that a victim's system 
resources are used up and it cannot attend to 
legitimate requests and hence becomes paralyzed. 
 
DDoS progresses in stages and can therefore be said 
to have different phases. At each phase there are 
some observable events that occur and these events 
can be used to predict the state of the system and 
what could happen in the system in the foreseeable 
future. According to the experiments run by the MIT 
Lincoln Lab (MIT Lincoln Lab, 2000) in which a 
DDoS attack was run by a novice attacker over 
multiple networks and audit sessions, DDoS attack 
session can be grouped into five phases as 
follows:Lee, K., Kim, J., Kwon, K. H., Han, Y., Kim, 
S.(2008) 
1) IPsweep to the DMZ(demilitarized zone) 
hosts from a remote site. 
2) Probe of live IP’s to look for the sadmind 
daemon running on Solaris hosts. 
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3) Breaks-in via the sadmind vulnerability, 
both successful and unsuccessful on those 
hosts. 
4) Installation of the Trojan mstream DDoS 
software on three hosts in the DMZ. 
5) Launching the DDoS. 
During each phase, there are certain features that 
could be observed in the network traffic. During the 
first phase, for instance, the attacker sends a lot of 
spurious Internet Control Message Protocol 
(ICMP)echo trying to get security vulnerable hosts 
that would act as agents and handlers for the attack. It 
is, therefore, possible to predict DDoS attack by 
studying the traffic features of the network at each 
stage.  
In this study, the entropy concept is 
employed to analyse the network traffic at each phase 
of the attack. The network features at each phase are 
then used as the observable parameters in the 
proposed forecasting method. The rest of the paper is 
organised as follows: Section 2 presents previous 
research works related to this study; section 3 
presents the proposed method; simulation 
experiments are presented in Section 4; Section 5 is 
the results, while conclusion and future work are 
presented in section 6 and 7 of the paper respectively. 
 
2.0 RELATED WORKS 
Jemili, F., Zaghdoud, M. and Ahmed, M. B. (2009) 
proposed an intrusion detection and prediction 
system which recognizes an upcoming intrusion and 
predicts the attacker’s attack plan and intentions. 
Graph techniques were applied based on Bayesian 
reasoning for learning. Also, inference was applied to 
recognize the attack type and predict upcoming 
attacks. The inference process is based on hybrid 
propagation, which takes into consideration both the 
uncertain and imprecise character of information. 
While the system demonstrates high performance in 
detecting intrusions, correlating and predicting 
attacks, there were still some challenges in attack 
plan recognition and, of course, the system worked in 
a static environment. 
Pontes, E. and Guelfi A. E. (2009) showed a 
collaborative architecture of IDS with prediction 
approaches, covering the gaps of the current 
forecasting techniques. A proof of concept of the 
architecture was presented, which allows conclusion 
about the improvement in forecasts for IDS to cope 
with Unwanted Internet Traffic (UIT). 
Gao, Bo, Hui-Ye Ma, and Yu-Hang Yang 
(2002) developed an Hidden Markov Model (HMM) 
to predict attacks in the application layer, an 
approach, which they claimed could be extended for 
network layer.  
Arnes, A., Valeur, F., Vigna, G. and 
Kemmerer, R. A. (2006) used to represent the 
likelihood of transitions between security states. The 
models parameters were manually estimated, which 
was more tedious and prone to error than using of a 
training algorithm. 
Haslum, K., Abraham, A, and Knapskog, S 
(2009) used an HMM that models only integrity and 
confidentiality, and make no attempts to model 
availability. They believe that availability is best 
modeled separately. Preliminary experimental result 
from the system indicates that their proposed 
framework is efficient for real time distributed 
intrusion monitoring and prevention. 
Lee et al (2008) propose a method for 
proactive detection of DDoS attack by exploiting the 
characteristic nature of its architecture comprising of 
handlers and agents selection, communication and 
compromise, and finally, attack.  Cluster analysis was 
performed for proactive detection of the attack. The 
method demonstrated good performance in detecting 
precursors of DDoS attack as well as the attack itself. 
However, there is need to extend the work to predict 
different  types of DDoS attack and datasets. 
Kim, S., Shin, S., Kim, H., Kwon, K. and 
Han, Y. (2010) worked on a hybrid approach that 
combined time-series analysis, probabilistic modeling 
(Markov Chain model) and data mining method to 
forecast intrusion. Experimental results showed that 
among the three hybrid methods, the combination of 
the time-series analysis and the Markov chain method 
shows the best performance in reducing the false 
alarm rate. They concluded that there is need to 
develop new intrusion forecasting methods that 
provide improved accuracy of predictions with a 
lower false alarm rate as well as developing an alert 
correlation algorithm between each forecasting 
method in order to achieve earlier and more precise 
forecasting of attacks. 
An, X. and  Jutla, D. (2006) proposed a 
model that applied DBN to privacy intrusion 
detection in temporal environments. The approach's 
objective was to handle general internal attacks on 
databases to steal large volume of private data. 
However, the model was not formulated from real 
data. 
Shin, S., Lee, S., Kim, H. and Kim, S. 
(2013) proposed a probabilistic approach to 
effectively forecast and detect network intrusions. 
The approach uses a Markov chain for probabilistic 
modeling of abnormal events in network systems. K-
means clustering was performed to define the 
network states, with the introduction of the concept 
of an outlier factor. The degree of abnormality of the 
incoming data was stochastically measured, in real-
time, based on the defined states. The performance of 
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the approach was evaluated by experiments using the 
DARPA 2000 data set. Although in the work, the 
various features of the DDoS attack and the concept 
of entropy were mentioned, it was not used in the 
formulation of the model. Also, the need to improve 
the accuracy of prediction of the model was 
mentioned. 
Flores, J. J., Antolino, A. and Garcia, J. M.  
(2010) proposed a system that performs network 
anomaly detection through the use of Hidden Markov 
Models (HMMs). Genetic Algorithms (GAs) were 
used in designing and training the HMMs used in 
detecting anomalies. This helps in the automation of 
the use of HMM because with it, users do not have 
need for statistical knowledge necessary for software 
that trains HMMs from data. The GA determines the 
necessary parameters such as, number of states, 
connections and weights, and probability 
distributions of states. Comparing the results obtained 
with those from Baum-Welch algorithmproved that, 
in all tested cases, GA outperforms Baum-Welch 
(Flores, et al (2010)). The best of the resulting 
HMMs was used to perform anomaly detection in 
network traffic activity with real data. 
Considering the previous schemes, there is 
commonlytradeoff between prediction efficiency and 
cost. Increasing the prediction accuracy often leads to 
increase in false alarm rate or increase in 
computational overheads or memoryoverheads. 
While accurate prediction is very important for 
preparing defense measures in DDoS attacks, most of 
the previous researches have been focused on the 
traffic generated by agents to extract prediction 
parameters. It is valuable to study and analyze the 
traffic generated during attack preparation phases as 
well as that generated during attack phases for 
optimal attack prediction. Hence, the need to develop 
a methodto predict the possibility of intrusion in time 
for steps to be taken to avert it without adding too 
much overhead in terms of resources consumption 
which might adversely affect the performance of the 
system. 
 
3.0 THE PROPOSED METHOD 
In this section, the Hidden Markov Model and its 
major properties are described briefly. After which 
the problem to be solved in this paper is clearly 
reviewed. 
Prediction of network intrusion, of which DDoS 
attack is a type, is generally viewed as a pattern 
recognition problem, and as such, it can be solved 
using one of two broad approaches: structural and 
empirical (Kumar and Ravi, 2007). The former 
derives the probability of a network for default based 
on its characteristics and dynamics, while the latter 
approach relies on previous knowledge and 
relationships in the area under study, learns from 
existing data or experience, and deploys statistical or 
intelligent methods to predict intrusion. The HMM 
that is employed in this work falls under intelligent 
methods. 
Just as several methods had been applied to 
forecasting DDoS attacks, HMM had been applied to 
forecasting network intrusion, the difference had 
been in the methods used in determining the 
observable states of the system. 
 
3.1 Hidden Markov models (HMMs) 
A HMM is a temporal probabilistic model with two 
embedded stochastic processes: an unobservable 
(hidden) process S, which can be observed only 
through another (visible/observable) stochastic 
process O. Each state in Q (the set S of hidden 
states)has state-transition probabilities (which are not 
visible) and a probability distribution over the 
possible values of O. The key assumption is that the 
current hidden state of the system is affected only by 
its previous state.  
HMM is usually defined as a 5-tuple (S, O, P, Φ, π), 
(Ibe, O. C. (2009)) where: 
S = {s1, s2, …, sN} is a finite set of N states 
O = {o1, o2, …, oM} is a finite set of M possible 
symbols 
P = {Pij} is the set of state-transition probabilities 
where pij is the probability that the system goes from 
state si to sj 
Φ = {φi(ok)} are the observation probabilities, where 
φi(ok) is the probability that the symbol ok is emitted 
when the system is in state si.  
π = {πi} are the initial probabilities; i.e. πi is the 
probability that the system starts in state si. 
Since the states and output sequence are understood, 
it is customary to denote the parameters of an HMM 
by λ = (P, Φ, π). 
HMM can be formally represented as in Figure 1 
below where Si are the hidden states that we would 
like to estimate and the Oi are the observation random 
variables from which the Si are to be estimated. The 
letters B and E indicate the Beginning and End of the 
sequence of states.
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Fig. 1: General Structure of an HMM 
 
 
There are three basic problems to be solved in HMM 
and each of these problems has specific solution 
methods/algorithm similar to those of Bayesian 
Networks (BNs) and Dynamic Bayesian Networks 
(DBNs). 
 The Classification/Evaluation problem: this 
deals with how to efficiently compute the 
probability that a particular model λ = (P, Φ, 
π) generated a given observation sequence V 
= v1, v2, …, vT of length T where vi ε O. 
 The Inference/Decoding problem: 
determining the most likely sequence of 
hidden states that could have generated a 
given observation sequence given a model λ 
= (P, Φ, π) 
 The Learning/Estimation problem: finding 
the model λ that best explains a given  
observation sequences. i.e. to estimate the 
most likely HMM parameters for a given 
observation sequence. 
The first problem is usually solved by the application 
of the Forward-Backward algorithm (Ibe, O. C. 
(2009)).  
The second HMM problem is solved by the 
application of a specific type of the forward 
algorithm named Viterbi algorithm. Though Viterbi 
algorithm (Ibe, O. C. (2009)), was originally 
designed for decoding convolutional codes, it is 
applied in many other areas. In HMM, it is used to 
find the most likely state sequence Q* = {   
∗ ,   
∗,…, 
  
∗ } for a given observation sequence  O = o1, o2, …, 
oT.  
Let function: 
 arg max {  } 
denotes the argument y that corresponds to the 
maximum of the expression z. The Viterbi algorithm 
simultaneously maximises both the joint probability 
P[q, O] and the conditional probability P[q|O]. It 
defines the variable δt(i) as below: 
δt(i) = max  ,  ,      [q1, q2, …, qt-1, qt = si, 
o1, o2, ot-1,…, ot|λ] 
This means δt(i) is the largest probability along a 
single path that accounts for the first t observations 
and ends in state si. It is therefore the probability of 
the most likely state path for the partial observation 
sequence. A variable c stores the node of the 
incoming edge that leads to this most probable path. 
i.e. 
ψ1(i) = arg max     {δt-1(i)pij} 
The full algorithm is as in Ibe, O. C. (2009) 
The third HMM problem, the learning problem, deals 
with how to adjust the HMM parameters so that the 
given set of observations, usually called the training 
set, is represented by the model in the best way for 
the intended application. It is an optimization 
problem that seeks to find the parameters of the 
HMM that maximise the probability of a given 
observation sequence. An iterative method called the 
Baum-Welch algorithm (sometimes called forward-
backward algorithm) which is a special case of the 
Expectation Maximization (EM) method is employed 
to solve this. The algorithm is as in Ibe, O. C. (2009). 
 
3.2 Selection of parameters 
In order to effectively predict the DDoS attack, there 
is need to take cognisance of the DDoS attack right 
from the preparation stage. As written in the 
introduction, there are certain traffic features that 
could be observed at each stage of the attack. These 
traffic features could be used to predict the possibility 
of a DDoS attack. First, the traffic features 
throughout the entire phases of the DDoS is studied 
with a view of using them as the observable states of 
the HMM. Some of these features changes 
abnormally at each phase of the attack. In order to 
launch a DDoS attack, the attacker needs to select 
agents and handlers and this is usually done by 
sending ICMP Echo Request packets to find handlers 
and agents that could help attack (IPsweep). During 
this stage, a lot of ICMP traffic is transmitted to 
several host located on the Internet. Therefore, at this 
stage not only is there abnormally high rate of ICMP 
traffic occurrence compared to normal network traffic 
Observation variable 
Hidden state 
B 
O2 
E S3 S2 S1 
O3 O1 
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but also randomly distributed destination IP address 
in the network flow. Next come the communication 
and compromise stage when increased volume of 
occurrence of a traffic type such as ICMP, UDP, and 
TCP SYN can be observed since any of these can be 
used in message exchange between the handlers and 
agents. Finally, comes the attack stage. At this stage, 
the reverse of the distribution of destination IP 
address and source IP address during the IPsweep 
stage is observed. i.e. the attack packets have 
randomly distributed source IP address focused on 
the destination IP address of the victim. 
Lee et al (2008) employed the concept of entropy to 
measure the degree of divergence of these features. 
Entropy H for an information source with n 
independent symbols each with choice probability Pi 
is given as: 
H = -∑  ( )     log   ( )    
     (1) 
Entropy can be computed on a sample of consecutive 
packets. Comparison of  entropy value of some 
sample of packet header fields to that of other 
samples of packet header fields provides a 
mechanism for perceiving changes in the randomness 
and can therefore be used as prediction parameter. 
When entropy value is used, the value of source IP 
address becomes small and that of destination IP 
address becomes large in the IPsweep phase. On 
other hand, in the DDoS attack period, the entropy 
value of source IP address increases and that of 
destination IP address converges to a very small 
value.  
The entropy values of source and destination port 
numbers can also be applied to predict DDoS attacks 
because some types of DDoS attacks use random port 
numbers in the attack period (Criscuolo, P. J. (2000)). 
In addition, the entropy value of packet type is worth 
observing because DDoS attacks use specific packet 
type such as ICMP flood attack and UDP flood attack 
(Houle, K. J., and Weaver, G. M. (2001), Criscuolo, 
P. J. (2000)). Convergence of packet type entropy to 
a small value is an indication that an attack is 
underway. As earlier mentioned, during the attack 
stage, the agents send huge amount of packets to the 
victim thereby jamming the network. Therefore the 
number of packets is a definite indication of an attack 
in progress. 
From the aforementioned analysis, the parameters for 
DDoS attack prediction can be represented as 
follows: 
 Entropy of source IP address 
 Entropy of source port number 
 Entropy of destination IP address 
 Entropy of destination port number 
 Entropy of packet type 
 Occurrence rate of ICMP 
 Occurrence rate of UDP 
 Occurrence rate of TCP-SYN, and  
 Number of packets 
 
4.0 THE EXPERIMENTS  
To implement the model, the DARPA 2000 
Intrusion Scenario Specific Datasets (MIT Lincoln 
Lab. 2000) was used. Specifically, LLDOS 2.0 - 
Scenario Two which presents attack scenario data 
sets created for DARPA that includes a DDoS attack. 
The downloaded data is the first attack scenario data 
set to be created for DARPA. It includes a distributed 
denial of service attack run by a novice attacker. It 
was reported that future versions of this and other 
example scenarios will contain more stealthy attack 
versions.(MIT Lab. 2000) 
This attack scenario is carried out over multiple 
networks and audit sessions. The sessions have been 
grouped into five attack phases, over the course of 
which the attacker probes the network, breaks in to a 
host by exploiting the Solaris sadmind vulnerability, 
installs trojan mstream DDoS software, and launches 
a DDoS attack at an offsite server from the 
compromised host.  
The proposed model was developed through a 
training process using both the DARPA 1999 attack-
free dataset and the DARPA 2000 dataset with attack. 
From the data, the parameters listed in section 
3.2above were estimated and the results are as 
presented in Table 1and 2 below.
  
Table 1: Estimates of DDoS Features 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S/N Variables Attack free data  
(DARPA 1999) 
Intrusion Specific data 
(DARPA 2000) 
1. Entropy of source IP address 1.59 0.52 
2. Entropy of source port number 1.61 0.41 
3. Entropy of destination IP address 1.58 5.12 
4. Entropy of destination port number 1.50 0.43 
5. Entropy of packet type 1.12 0.55 
6. Number of packets 37.0 42.3 
7. Occurrence rate of ICMP 0.0 0.87 
8. Occurrence rate of UDP 0.0 0.99 
9. Occurrence rate of TCP-SYN 0.02 0.02 
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Table 2: Estimates of DDoS Features at each Phase 
Variables Phase1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 
Entropy of source IP address 0.52 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.03 
Entropy of source port number 0.41 0.13 0.12 0.12 13.2 
Entropy of destination IP address 5.12 0.07 0.08 0.07 12.8 
Entropy of destination port number 0.43 0.14 0.11 0.12 12.9 
Entropy of packet type 0.55 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.03 
Number of packets 42.3 1.21 1.32 1.21 6235 
Occurrence rate of ICMP 0.87 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Occurrence rate of UDP 0.01 0.98 0.01 0.0 0.01 
Occurrence rate of TCP-SYN 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.92 
 
In Table 1, for the DARPA 2000 data set, the 
parameters were estimated at the first phase of the 
attack scenario. Table 2 presents the estimates of the 
parameters at each phase of the attack. From Table 2 
it can be observed that there was no observable 
change in the network traffic for phases 4 and 5. This 
is understandable because those are the phases in 
which the attacker intrudes the hosts of agents and 
installs the attack software. 
To formulate the HMM, the transition matrix, the 
initial probability matrix, and the emission matrix 
have to be determined. However, a detection model 
must not have too many parameters else the 
computation will become intractable and the 
operation time will increase. For this reason, the 
transition matrix is formulated to be a 2 x 2 matrix (it 
is assumed that the system can only be in one of two 
states: normal (N) and compromised (R) which 
correspond to the hidden states). It should be noted 
that for this work phase 1 of the DDoS phases was 
taken as the compromised state. This is logical since 
the objective of the work is to predict attack. We 
want to use the precursors to the DDoS attack to 
predict the possibility of an attack.  
The observable states in this work have been reduced 
to three and the states are drawn from the nine 
parameters listed above. To reduce the space of 
observable variables from nine to three, Kullback-
Leibler divergence (KLD) (Aczél, J. and Daróezy, Z. 
(1975)) algorithm is applied. 
 
4.1 Definition of Kullback-Liebler divergence 
For discrete probability distributions P and Q, the 
KLD of Q from P is defined to be:  
( || ) = ∑  ( )   ln
 ( )
 ( )
    
     (2) 
It can be described as the expectation of the 
logarithmic difference between the probabilities P 
and Q, where the expectation is taken using the 
probabilities P. The KLD is only defined ifQ(i) = 
0⇒P(i) = 0, for all i (absolute continuity). If the 
quantity 0ln0 appears in the formula, it is interpreted 
as zero since lim →   ln ( ) = 0. 
From the results got from the implementation of the 
KLD, the model was formulated using Entropy of 
Source IP address (denoted by S), Entropy of 
Destination IP address (denoted by D), and 
occurrence rate of packet type (denoted by C) as the 
observable states. 
The entropies of each of the selected variables were 
then computed using equation (1) 
The dataset is very large, so for the model training, it 
was partitioned into several subsets with each subset 
having hundreds of records with different sizes and 
below are the results obtained: 
 
5.0 RESULTS 
The model comprising of a 2 x 2 transition matrix, a 
2 x 3 output matrix and initial probability matrix was 
formulated using the aforementioned. To estimate the 
parameters for normal network traffic without attack, 
the DARPA 1999 week 1 attack free dataset was 
used. The HMM model was formulated and trained 
using the DARPA 2000 data set. The dataset was 
divided into two disjoint sets: the training set and the 
test set. The learning algorithm was applied to the 
training set, generating the HMM model after which 
the percentage data in the test set that were correctly 
classified by the model was measured. These steps 
were repeated for different sizes of training set and 
different randomly selected training sets of various 
sizes. 
The results obtained are as below:  
The HMM [λ = (P, Φ, π)]  
The initial probability matrix (π) = 0.72 0.28 
The Transition Matrix (P) = 
0.82 0.18
0.98 0.02
 
The Observation Matrix (Φ) =
0.45 0.37 0.18
0.72 0.08 0.20
 
The model is graphically represented as below: 
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Table 2: Model Training Results: 
No. of Iterations P Φ 
1.  0.8422    0.1578 
    0.9927    0.0073 
    0.4206    0.4241    0.1553 
    0.6788    0.1095    0.2117 
2.  0.8066    0.1934 
0.9758    0.0242 
    0.4489    0.3810    0.1701 
    0.7500    0.0645    0.1855 
3.      0.8190    0.1810 
    0.9713    0.0287 
    0.4757    0.3529    0.1714 
    0.7452    0.0892    0.1656 
4.      0.8141    0.1859 
    0.9874    0.0126 
    0.4501    0.3588    0.1911 
    0.7197    0.0884    0.1919 
5.      0.8341    0.1659 
    0.9571    0.0429 
    0.4394    0.3764    0.1843 
    0.7387    0.0878    0.1734 
 
 
6.0 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we present a forecasting model based 
on the precursors to DDoS attack. The concept of 
entropy was used in determining the observable states 
of the HMM. In order to avoid computational 
intractability, KLD was used to reduce the number of 
parameters after which the HMM was formulated as 
a state-space representation. Based on the defined 
states, the initial probability matrix, the transition 
matrix and the emission matrixwas built. After which 
the model was employed in real-time determination 
of the level of abnormality of the incoming data.  
The performance of the proposed method was 
empirically measured using the DARPA 2000 data 
set. The research has shown that features of the 
DDoS attack can be used as observable states of an 
HMM to predict attack in a network. 
 
7.0 FUTURE WORK 
More experiments would be performed and the 
system performance would be compared with the 
existing work. In order to do this, the HMM's hidden 
states would be increased so also the observable 
states.  
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